my claim that, underlying her belief in the likelier adequacy of state provision than private provision, is an assumption that politicians are more charitable and provident than their electorate. This assumption is said to be absent because politicians, in providing such resources, are not giving away their own money and are making such provision through the instrument of law which is more reliable than private inclinations. But it is difficult to see how, in a democratic political system, politicians -whatever their motives -can persistently flout the wishes or inclinations of the bulk of the electorate. So the attribution of greater reliability to state provision must rest either upon the assumption that democratic politicians are, on this issue, invariably willing to commit electoral suicide, or upon the assumption that politicians would prefer to become undemocratic rather than jeopardize state health care programmes. Both of these assumptions attribute greater charity to politicians than to their electorate.
Second, she argues that although state provision depends in principle upon the general retention of a sense of responsibility, in practice it undermines that sense and, thus, tends in the long term to be self destroying. It is not clear how this argument can be reconciled with Miss Telfer's previous point about the greater reliability of state provision. Nor is this the place to rehearse Kant's strictures about the common saying 'This may be true in theory but it does not apply in practice'. In any case, whether certain policies have a long-term tendency to erode the conditions for their own maintenance is an empirical (and not a philosophical) question, with the onus of proof surely lying on those who claim that an actually existing commitment will cease to exist.
Finally, Miss Telfer suggests that an equal distribution of wealth, coupled with unrestricted personal freedom to spend one's wealth, would require a greater degree of state control over private individuals -to establish that equality -than would a system whereby the state regulates and provides a wide range of services, and confiscates accordingly. Again, this seems to me to be an empirical rather than a philosophical contention, the truth of which entirely depends upon the kind of institutions and practices adopted for conferring an equal share of wealth upon each person. What does seem to be necessarily true, however, is that under such an arrangement the allocative pattern of goods and services would more closely conform to the detailed variety of individuals' respective preference orderings than would be the case under any other arrangement.
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University of Manchester psychiatry was trying to get away from the image of high walls and locked doors it would have been a backward step to set up secure units. Now in accepting the Butler Report the Government is attempting to sugar the pill for the mental hospitals which establish secure units by offering more money for training and research and it is possible that nurses in such units can earn more money than they would in the ordinary way. Thus many mental hospitals threatened by closure are now clutching at the straw of the secure unit as a means of staying in business and preserving their identity. This is, in spite of the fact that much has been achieved in recent years by the open-door policy in mental hospitals, in spite of the fact that the mental hospitals hold no responsibility for the errors of judgment which led to the setting up of the Butler Committee, and also in spite of the fact that only one member of the Butler Committee came from the staff of a mental hospital.
In my view, the reforms should take place in the special hospitals. In the first place they are inadequate in number. 
